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	COUNTRY	USSR/	Germany (Sovi	et Zone)			DATE DISTR 91. Jur	. 52
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			Formations a	nd Employment	of Va	rious Units		
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			by Stal rifle, formati of the regimen and unv heavy 1 heavily tions p	in, increased mechanized, a cons of infant infantry divits forward ar aried usage cosses to the hit by enemy rescribed in a (and simi	I the cound tand tand tand tand tand tand the cound tand tand tand tand tand tand tand ta	rganic artille k divisions; in til that time as in two eche to the rear. one formation echelon which lery. The new	t also changed the the basic order clons, with two The continual resulted in was always types of formatollows for the	
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- (1) In direct frontal attack "Uglom V Peryed" (wedge) formation with one regiment forward and two in the rear; or "Uglom Nazad" (inverted wedge) with two regiments forward and one in the rear.
- (2) In attack on left flank of enemy "Ustupom V Levo" with three regiments in staggered formation, each to the left rear of the preceeding one.
- (3) In attack on right flank of enemy "Ustupom V Prava" with the three regiments in staggered formation, each to the right rear of the preceeding one.
- (4) In pursuit "V Liniyu" with all three regiments on line.
- (b) A rifle division usually keeps one rifle regiment in reserve about one kilometer behind the lines; a rifle regt usually keeps one battalion in reserve (battalion stays with regt hqs about one kilometer behind the lines); a rifle battalion usually keeps one company in reserve (Company stays with bn hqs); and a rifle company usually keeps one platoon in reserve. The reserve unit does not participate in the initial attack and is called upon only as reinforcement. See Enclosure (A), Diagram of a typical infantry attack position.
- 3. The employment of the HV MG Co in battalion varies according to the situation and is as follows:
 - (a) It does not fire during artillery preparation
 - (b) It moves with the attacking force in the assault, firing only on observed enemy personnel and gun positions when they are in range.
 - (c) In battle in the depth of enemy defenses, it fires only on observed enemy personnel and firing points when in range and repels counterattacks in perimeter firing.
 - (d) The MG Co commander decides, in consideration of the tactical situation, when to centralize or decentralize the MG Co.
 - (e) I do not know about fire control in the HV MG Co.
 - (f) In pursuit, the HV MG Co moves with the troops, firing only on observed enemy personnel and gun positions when these are in range.
 - (g) The HV MG Co is always on the flanks of the rifle companies to provide flank cover and fires on observed targets only.
- 4. The employment of a 82-mm mortar company and a 120-mm mortar battery varies according to tactical situation and is as follows:
 - (a) They participate in the artillery preparation;
 - (b) They are emplaced about 1.5 km behind the infantry in alignment; are used in defilade only;
 - (c) They displace and transfer their fire from the front line of the enemy to his depth when the battle shifts to the assault;
 - (d) They displace and fire into the depth of enemy defense while emplaced 1.5 km behind the infantry.
 - (e) They displace and fire in pursuit while about one to two km behind the infantry.

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(f) The mortar forward observers, their communications, and fire direction are the same as for artillery

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- 5. The 57-mm AT guns move with the infantry or up to 200 m behind it at all times and at all levels. They can also be used for anti-personnel firing but are usually on the flanks of the infantry for AT cover.
- 6. The 76-mm self-propelled guns are under centralized control at regiment at all times. They move right along with the infantry.
- 7. On the tactics of AAA MGs and 37-mm AAA guns in attack the regulations are the following:
 - (a) AAA MGs and 37-mm AAAs fire only on aircraft and do not participate in the artillery barrage preceding the attack or in the attack. They are located from 200 to 1000 m behind the infantry lines at all times and have the primary mission of warding off attacks by aircraft. If tanks appear, however, the 37-mm guns will fire on them providing the tanks offer a threat to the 37-mm guns or to the unit which the AAA is protecting. A 37-mm AAA battery is usually charged with protecting an infantry regiment or a division headquarters or some other specified unit.
- 8. In the build up of forces for an attack, the emplacement of units is prescribed as follows:
 - (a) The forward assembly area for infantry units, which is also the jump-off area, will be as close to the MLR (main line of resistance) as possible but will not be farther away from the MLR than 1.5 km.
 - (b) Tanks and artillery assemble no further than two or three kilometers behind the MLR and AAA units no further than two kilometers behind the MLR.
 - (c) Rear assembly areas and concentration areas arc selected terrain features and there is no set distance for these areas; however, they should be as close to the forward assembly areas as possible.
- 9. Rules concerning the location of command posts and their composition are as follows:
 - (a) Command posts of all levels, (div, regt, bn, co) are located as far forward in the front lines as possible since they also serve as observation posts. Unit commanders observe the progress of battle, guide artillery and direct whatever action is necessary for the completion of the assigned mission from the command posts.
 - (b) Divisional command posts are composed of the Division Commander, two operations officers, one ren officer, Deputy for Artillery, five to 10 men with radio and telephones, including some reconnaissance men, and two or three messengers.
 - (c) Regimental command posts are composed of the Regimental Commander, one operations officer, one ron officer, Deputy for Artillery, five to 10 men with radio and telephones, including reconnaissance men, and two or three messengers.

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- (d) Battalion command posts are composed of the Battalion Commander, Operations Officer, one ron officer, two radio men, two telephone men, two ron men, and two messengers.
- (e) Administration and logistical problems for division and regiment are taken care of by staff officers at second echelon head-quarters five to 10 km behind the lines.
- 10. The depth of objectives for bns, regts, divs, and corps is not fixed. Infantry is assigned an overall objective but there is no limitation as to the depth of the objective for battalion, regiment, division or corps. The infantry moves forward without stopping until it accomplishes its assigned mission. Should the infantry be held up by obstacles, the regt or div deputy for artillery will order artillery (size of unit and caliber depending upon the obstacle) to eliminate the obstacle.
- 11. No special combat teams are formed for pursuit or other missions. All mechanized units and infantry engage in pursuit of the enemy; all infantry, artillery, tanks, and SPs participate in the attack.
- 12. On the communications system used in all units and in particular between infantry and artillery I can say the following:
 - (a) Radio, telephone, semaphore, rocket flares and messengers, I believe are used in all units. Communications between infantry troops and artillery must go through the combined commander who is always the rifle unit commander. The Soviets use no artillery liaison officers but each infantry unit from rifle regt up has a deputy for artillery with his own staff for coordination of organic and attached artillery. I remember the case of an artillery battalion supporting an infantry battalion. The infantry battalion commander was the combined commander and maintained communication with the suporting artillery.
 - (b) Communications between artillery and infantry are usually maintained by use of radio, telephone and messengers; however, semaphore and rocket flares are also used. Radio is the most widely used means of communication; however, artillery batteries are the lowest command which are assigned radios.
 - (c) If a mortar battery or battalion commander while observing and directing the fire of his unit, feels that artillery fire is necessary for the elimination of a certain target he can radio or telephone the Deputy for Artillery on regimental level. The latter, if he considers it necessary, will issue the appropriate orders to the supporting artillery commander.

Defense

13. In positional defense the frontage and depth of various units are as follows, according to

			Frontage		Depth					
(a)	Rifle	Corps	up	to	12 km	up	to	8	km	
(b)	Rifle	Div	up	to	6 karı	up	to	,6	km	
(c)	Rifl e	Regt	up	to	2.5 km	up	to	2.	. lan	

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		<u>Frontage</u>	<u>Depth</u>		
(a)	Rifle Bn	up to 2 km	up to 1.5 km		
(e)	Rifle Co	up to 1 km	up to 0.8 km		

- 14. I have heard of first and second defense lines, but never of a third. I can make a drawing of a typical divisional defensive organizational plan although the disposition of the units may vary according to tactical requirements. Each defense zone is about three to four km in depth and is separated by minefields. I do not know the density of the minefields. See Enclosure (B)7.
- 15. In defense artillery units are located as follows:
 - (a) HV MGs are used as flank cover on front line if the terrain permits it. 82-mm and 120-mm mortars are 1.5 km behind the MLR.
 - (b) 76-mm SP guns are also flank cover and located on or slightly behind the front lines.
 - (c) 57-mm AT guns, are kept under centralized regimental control, but they support battalions, and are in front line with the infantry.
- 16. AT defense is organized and coordinated as follows:
 - (a) Each artillery unit commander has an assigned sector and must destroy all tanks in his sector. All guns ie, field pieces and AAA guns, are used as AT guns when necessary.
 - (b) AT defense is under the command of the Deputy for Artillery who is subordinate to the overall commander (Regimental CO or Divisional CO, as the case may be).
 - (c) If infantry cannot overcome an obstacle, it radios to its commander who directs its Deputy for Artillery to use artillery to crush this obstacle.
 - (d) Such tie-ins and others between infantry and artillery fire which may be required by tactical development are accomplished on orders from the overall commander.
- 17. Each infantry unit provides its own security. It is up to the division commander to select troops for the security zone.

Special Operations

- 18. Night operations are usually not preceded by artillery preparations since the Soviet Army employs night attacks as surprise attacks only.
- .19. Tanks and self-propelled guns function the same way in support of infantry at night as in daytime.
- 20. On mountain infantry units and their training I can say the following:
 - (a) A captain /name unknown/ who arrived from Stalinabad /3830N-6845E/ in the fall of 1951 as a replacement in the 57th Gds Rifle Division told me that there were only two mountain divisions in the USSR. One mountain division was stationed in Stalinabad, Turkestan MD, and the other mountain division was stationed near Kishinev /4700N-2850E/ in the Carpathian MD.

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
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- (b) I have never heard of specialized training in mountain operations given to regular troops and know nothing about the tactical doctrine of mountain warfare.
- 21. There are no set rules for the makeup of assault teams. The regimental or divisional commander and his deputy for artillery decide how many infantry, tank, SP, AT, and artillery units will participate in the assault against a particular strong point.
- 25X122. For river crossings see describing in detail the Elbe River crossings made during maneuvers.
 - 23. On airborne tactics I can say the following:
 - (a) In WW II parachute troops were committed to seize bridgeheads or to attack headquarters or supply depots in the rear of the enemy. Their efforts were not very successful and very little use of parachute troops was made in WW II.
 - (b) There were no airborne divisions (air-landing divisions) in the Soviet Army in WW II.
 - (c) The 39th Gds Rifle Div and the 57th Gds Rifle Div now in the Soviet Zone of Germany are of divisions.
 - (d) I have no additional knowledge of OB or tactics or airborne divisions or of parachute units.
 - 24. About tactics in forests and swamps I can say the following:
 In WW II the Germans always had their headquarters in forests but
 the Soviets learned that locating headquarters in forests resulted
 in poor front line control of troops. The Soviets have their
 headquarters in the open and as near the front lines as possible,
 camouflaged and protected by AA and AT guns.

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ENCLOSURE (A): Diagram of a typical Infantry attack position with legend (B): Diagram of Soviet Rifle Division in defense

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ENCLOSURE (A)

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Typical Infantry Attack Position

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Source gave following typical attack situation of a Rifle Division:

3 Infantry Regiments in line or as given above in paragraph 2.

Tanks, SU-76, SU-100, 57-mm AT guns, 37-mm AA guns move with the infantry. 37-mm AA guns may (subject to tactical considerations) be to 1 km bahind the infantry, and tanks may be from 200 km up to 2 km behind infantry lines.

85-mm AAA guns are 1-2 km behind infantry lines. Regimental Artillery of Rifle Regiments (82-mm and 120-mm mortars and 76-mm AA guns) are \$\frac{1}{2}\$ km behind infantry lines. Divisional Artillery of Rifle Divisions (122-mm Howitzers, 76-mm field guns, 122-mm field guns) are 2-6 km behind infantry lines.

Rifle Corps Artillery (Rocket Launchers M-17, 76-mm and 100-mm and 123-mm field guns, 152-mm Howitzers, 120-mm and 160-mm Mortars) are up to 12 km behind the infantry lines. Source could not give the specific mission of each weapon, but states that the guns support the assault by direct fire on pill boxes, field fortifications, tanks, firing positions and personnel. If artillery units are attached to a Rifle Division, the units would be in about the same formation as units of Rifle Division with the same caliber guns as given above.

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ENCLOSURE (B)

